Many Japanese firms instituted or reinvigora ted corpora te planning·activi ties during this period (Kohno, 1967) .
When one country attempts to adop t a managemen t me thod that has been developed for another, an interplay between the two cul tural ra tionales inevitably occurs.
Corporate planning in the West is essentially a "rational" endeavor to se t and achieve a feasible purpose mos t "efficiently", where both "rational" and "efficiently" are defined in terms of the values of Western cul ture (Weber, 1949; Parsons, 1952) . Thus, in the West, the prime emphasis to date has been on the logical, deductive, scientific aspects of the process (Branch, 1966) . When these original premises of Western corporate planning are in terpreted and put into practice wi thin the Japanese cultural environment, interactions between the two cultures create various problems which are interes ting from the international and comparative managemen t perspectives.
It should be pointed out here, however, that the completeness of corporate planning is contingent upon many variables, only some of which are cultural.
The problems are especially complex because the concept and prac tice of plan-..
ning itself are not new in Japan.
Since there still is no generally-accep ted theory of corporate planning (S teiner, 1969; Branch, 1966; Kohno, 1966) , the first task of this paper is to define a set of theoretical premises which can serve as an adequa te basis for an examination of the state of Japanese corporate planning.
SOME FUNDAMENTAL PREMISES OF CORPORATE PLANNING
The fundamental premises of corporate planning are defined here by specifying the crucial dimensions of a se t of essential ingredien ts in the corpora te planning process. The set of essential ingredients includes: objective, means, .
implementation, and planning organization. It should be cautioned in the outset, however, that the set of premises that will be defined here is not intended to be definitive or exhaustive. There may be other premises, such as environmental monitoring, but for the present purposes we have limited ourselves to the following based on these four ingredients.
a) The Objective:
3
The objective represents the state of affairs which the firm aspires to achieve. The gap between the existing state of affairs and the state of affairs to which the firm aspires, however, is not necessarily complex enough to justify the cost of planning. Thus, not all objectives require planning.
The crucial dimension of the objective is its feasibility. When the feasibility is less than obvious because of the time.span involved, the amo unt and diversity of-resources required, or the uncertainty associated with any relevant events, . the gap may be said to be complex and the objective requires planning. Here planning is viewed as a systematic effort to improve feasi bility of a high-level objective. The feasibility assessment may force a redefinition of an initial aspiration since only a feasible objective is meaningful to a serious decision-maker.
An objective (e.g., a 15 per cent annual rate of growth in net profit) has a hierarchical structure consisting of subobjectives (i.e. , nodes in PERT).
These subobjectives are compo. sed into time-phased programs of action to achieve the objective. Thus, the feasibility of the objective reflects the feasibility of the subobjectives. Objectives may be strategic objectives or operating objectives depending upon the nature of the programs required.
Operating objectives may be achieved basically by continuous extension of past programs while strategic objectives require discontinuous change in these programs. Therefore, feasibility of the latter is less obvious than 4 that of the former, thus implying that the latter requires more planning.
Objectives al$o may be long-range or short-range, depending upon the time span required for their achievement. As the time span increases, the need for planning usually grows.
a planning span.
However, the level of planning technology limits
The second essential ingredient of corporate planning is the prescription of the means by which to achieve the objective. The means are specified by programs of action that are expected to achieve the objective (e.g., 1966) . One crucial dimension of programs is consistency.
The means prescribed for the attainment of a given objective must be consistent with each other on the two dimensions of time and function, as discussed by Ackoff (1970) . We must add another dimension, however, for multinational planning --that of space.
Time dimension: To achieve high-level objectives, various interdependent actions in the time sequence must be consistent with each other. Interdependence in the time dimension implies that the achievement of an objective at a future time n depends upon action at time n-1, which in turn depends upon action at time n-2, etc., which in turn depends upon action at time 0 or at present. In other words, to achieve the objective at time n most efficiently, all the preceding actions must be mutually consistent and conducive to achievement of that objective. This principle applies within each shortrange plan and each long-range plan as well as among all plans of different spans in the temporal chain. All actions in the future obviously depend upon the present action, but the present action must also depend upon the anticipated future actions if a cumulative effect toward achievement of an objective is to materialize. For this reason, a plan is said to be a set of anticipatory dec isions tha t make today's decisions and . actions meaningful in relation to a fu ture objective. One plans for the future to make meaningful decisions today (Drucker, 1959) . The extent to which consistency is achieved in the three dimensions is a function of the levels of aspiration, creativity, and planning skills within the organization and of internal and external constraints. However, the answer to the fundamental question as to whether corporate planning exists in an organization must involve an assessment of the degree to which there is a concerted effort to strive for such consistency. Therefore, motivational consideration should be an essential part of corporate planning (Ramsden, 19 73) . Note here that culture begins to play a role as soon as motivational elements are involved. Monitoring has two phases: one is to check whether the actions taken by an executor correspond to the actions prescribed in the program; the other is to identify any gaps between 7 performance achieved and performance planned. In either phase, divergencies must be either eliminated or they must be analyzed and evaluated for cor rective action on either the objective or on the program or on both.
Personnel evaluation accompanies this entire implementation process.
d) The Planning Organization:
The formulation and implementation of plans necessitate a planning organization. Therefore, the three premises identified above jointly define the crucial dimention of the planning organization its responsiveness.
The planning organization may be examined in terms of its structural attributes that will be responsive to the requirements of the preceding premises (Steiner & Cannon, 1966) . First, the final responsibility for corporate planning must rest with top management in order for top-managerial objectives to be formulated within the realm of corporate planning. Second, planning organization also should penetrate the entire organizational structure in order for programs of actions to be consistent in all dimensions. Third, this penetrativeness is essential also if the control process is to be based on corporate planning.
CORPORATE PLANNING IN JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS
The premises outlined above formed the basis for an examination of corporate planning practices in 19 Japanese corporations engaged in multi national business. Data were collected through interviews in Tokyo and Osaka.
The sample consisted of the largest international investors in each of Japan's most capital-exporting industries including three in general machinery, three in electrical machinery, two in chemicals, three in textiles, six in trading, one in transportation machiner y and one in foods. These firms' levels
Insert Table 1 about here of multinational business involvement are shown by Table 1 . In Table 1 Eleven firms (58%) had long-range objectives (ten used a five-year horizon and one firm was engaged in 10-year planning).
Insert Table 2 Two interpretations are possible. One is that these firms did no t adopt the basic concept of planning, namely, th at planning is undertaken essen
tially to determine what should be done "today", while the po int in time called "today" is constantly changing. The other is that they had not developed the planning technology to cope with vi(riables whose values change rapidly or erratically.
Another even more serious divergence from the feasibility premise was that in only five inst ances out of fifteen was the intermediate objective accompanied by clearly-stated strategic programs of action. Such programs were even fewer :f,J1 the case of firms with long-range objectives. Long-range objectives, in particular, were conceived independently of programs, either as a set of wishful quantitative goals or as a set of broad policy guidelines.
One planning officer said that corporate planning at his company consisted of identifying major problems and of creating an atmosphere conducive to the development of creative ideas and hard work within the company. This statement indicates that top management and the corporate staff formulated strategic objectives without careful feasibility assessment and hoped that individual strategic projects might emerge from below and from various units within the organization. These individual projects were not necessarily coordinated into an overall strategic plan, because individual plans could not be truly united without a top-managerial str ategic framework. No evidence existed to prove that this was a direct outcome of the Ringi system, 3 but the piecemeal character of Ringi was manifest in the phenomenon (Yoshino, 1968 , Yamashiro, 1967 Sethi, 1975 Before we go further, a brief illustration of how the Japanese manufac- One problem commonly mentioned in the entire sample was the time-consuming aspect of corporate planning, particularly in the bottom-up process.
This problem led to a lack of flexibility in the reviewing/renewing patterns, thus fettering strategic planning to the extent of decisive disfunctioning in some cases. It seems likely that this prohibitive consumption of time was caused in part by the lack of planning technology and in part by the consensusseeking behaviour typical of Japanese decision-making processes. Even if a firm does formulate a strategic plan, the usefulness of its plan ning activities is incomplete unless the plan is used as a basis for control.
In fact, for control purposes, each firm had a set of standards based on the firm's past performance averages. These averages were typically expressed in such ratios as either profit or sales relative to debt, or to the number of employees, or to operating expenses, exchange loss relative to sales, and the like. It was the evaluation based on these standards, rather than evaluation based on planning, that influenced annual bonuses. In the case of a leading electrical manufacturer, operating departments were so unconvinced and unaffected by corporate planning that they almost neglected their plans after they had formulated them. In another instance, in an oligopolistic industry, the operating departments usually spent a great deal of time in formulating equal capability in everybody implied that, insofar as everyone in the organization was working sincerely, the performance differential was a matter of chance rather than a matter of individual responsibility (Nakane, 1967 (Nakane, , 1970 ). The basic philosophy was that there are go od times and bad times for every department or division so that the organization as a whole should be responsible for performance differentials. Given this philosophy, it was unlikely that planning would be used for evaluation. Last, but not least, there was a lack of planning· and forecasting technology. In many firms it took so long to plan that management became discouraged about the whole idea of corpo rate planning in the context of rapid environmental changes. They began to distrust corporate planning in general, not to speak of their distrust of cor porate planning as a basis for the determination of individual promotion and bonuses. What seemed to be most difficult for the Japanese firms was _ to institute a device in their plans that would allow flexibility around tho se variables that were short-range or unpredictable. There was also a great deal of misunderstanding surrounding the basic concept of corporate planning. For instance, there were some corporate planners who believed that plans were not worthwhile if they needed to be reviewed too often or if th ey required feedback. The planning organization in the head office for international operations, however, showed transitional characteristi cs. Though every manufacturing company in the sample had an international division, the functions and scope of the responsibilities of these divisions varied greatly from one company to anot her, and in most cases the planning organization of the international division was fragmented.
PERSPECTIVE --EMERGING NEEDS AND RESPONSES
When multinationalization of Japanese business reaches a point where the ratio of overseas production to total world-wide production is as substantial as, say, 20 to 30 percent, an increased weight of international business markedly will enhance the need for a full range of corporate planning pro cedures. The main impetus will probably come from the increasing need for more effi cient communication between the Japanese headquarters and localized foreign outposts on the one hand, and turbulence and uncertainty in multi national environments on the other. More specifically, the likely impetus to corporate planning will be a strongly-felt need to produce common visions and understanding ( communication of long-range purposes), to motivate planners
overseas (participation in planning), and to contr' ol the executors of the plans (communication through the connn on reference), and thus to decentralize decisions without losing integration in ever-changing environments. Each of these needs implies very specific and ciear requirements for each of the essential in gredients of the corporate planning process. Although these ingredients will probably remain outside of the planning objectives,they are likely to influence·vitally the future patterns of corpo rate planning in Japan.
Secondly, the impact of the emerging needs upon the formulation of programs of action is likely to lead to requirements for greater flexibility and for the coordination of more actions and more complex intra-organizational relationships. The current response to these emerging needs is not in the I form of corporate planning, but in the form of the development of well-knit connn unication channels and vertically-linked group orientation under the permanent-employment system. In fact, many firms do not include the formulation of formal strategic programs as an essential part of planning. Where there is no program, flexibility exists. Such flexibility, however, tends to be influenced by short-range pressures rather than by long-range strategic considerations.
On the other hand, those firms that do have strategic programs tend to lack flexibility because of their reliance on a bottom-up planning aggregation in which the bottom area behaves quite unsystematically. These problems will probably be alleviated by the improvement of planning technology.
To the extent, however, that the lack of enthusiasm for formulating strategic programs stems from the socio-cultural attitude against formal communication and written rules, the development of planning technology may be delayed until the pressures become overwhelming.
Thirdly, structural complexities and communication barriers, particularly between cultures, will become increasingly demanding on control, the third essential ingredient. More actions involved in multiple dimensions would create greater chances of loss of efficiency unless a well-planned common re ference is developed. The current response, however, seems poorest in this area. The strategic plan often is not systematically monitored and it seldom provides the basis for evaluating individual or g�oup performance. Since the reason for this is most closely related to the behavioural characteristics of the culture, the existing pattern will resist change strongly. The mounting pressure will come from the need to decentralize international business decisions without losing control from the headquarters and from the increasing use of local personnel in foreign subsidiaries. As foreign subsidiary management becomes localized, communication between the headquarters and the local management will not be reinforced by the excellent credibility and common understanding that exist between Japanese managers under the permanent employment system. This will be the greatest challenge to Japanese ma � agement.
Fourthly, planning organizations will be further challenged by the new needs to improve structural efficiency. The man-centric orientation, in which positions are defined not in terms of tasks but in terms of their relative status, will perhaps persist. However, it is unlikely this will hinder organi zational development if the need for corporate planning is strongly felt.
Meanwhile, there is another key factor that will determine the future of corporate planning in Japan. That is the technology of planning and _ fore casting.
Since such technology is a technical rule rather than a formal or informal rule of the society (Hall, 1959) , advanced planni�g and forecasting skills will be accepted readily as far as their technical side is concerned.
In particular, planning innovations which improve the current time-consuming bottom-up process are likely to improve the ability of the planning process to keep pace with rapid environmental change and, thus, they will improve the general credibility of" long-range planning. Many of the current incogruities that arise from formal and informal rules of the culture may be alleviated by technical innovations. For instance, many of the problems that are currently matters of taste and opinion and, as such, require consensus-seeking procedures, will change into technical matters, so that the group-oriented range of activities may be reduced in size. The role of planning in relation to per formance evaluation may also be expanded as the credibility of the planning process itself improves.
In the short and intermediate run corporate planning procedures likely will continue to be developed and adjusted in subservience to the much more slowly-changing cultural characteristics of Japanese corporate management. 
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